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COMMENTS
CRIMINAL PROCEDURE-COUNSEL AT INTERROGATION*-Recent

decisions by the United States Supreme Court in the criminal procedure area have given rise to a flood of state habeas corpus petitions.
The decisions in Gideon v. Wainwright,1 Massiah v. United States,2
Jackson v. Denno,3 and Escobedo v. Illinois4 have caused concern
about their effect on efficient law enforcement.' State courts have
gone to great lengths to resist the full impact of a liberal reading of
these decisions.6 The purpose of this Comment is to examine the
New Mexico decision, Pece v. Cox, 7 in light of Escobedo v. Illinois,
and to show that a limited interpretation of the right to counsel at
interrogation will not meet the constitutional requirements established by the United States Supreme Court.
Pece v. Cox 8 related to the admissibility of a statement made in
the absence of counsel by an accused prior to a judicial hearing. A
Pece v. Cox, 74 N.M. 591, 396 P.2d 422 (1964) (appeal pending, U.S. Court of
Appeals, 10th Cir.). Pece involved several important problems in the area of criminal
procedure that remain unsettled. Unfortunately, the New Mexico Supreme Court has
contributed little to the solution of these problems. No facts were given in the Pece
opinion; therefore, it is of little value to the practicing attorney.
1. 372 U.S. 335 (1963). Gideon applied the sixth amendment right to counsel to the
states at the time of trial.
2. 377 U.S. 201 (1964). Massiah applied the sixth amendment right to counsel to
the states during post-arraignment interrogation.
3. 378 U.S. 368 (1964). Jackson declared unconstitutional the procedure of jury
determination of voluntariness of confessions.
4. 378 U.S. 478 (1964). Escobedo applied the sixth amendment right to counsel to
the states at the pre-arraignment stage.
5. Upon rehearing of a recent California Supreme Court decision applying Escobedo
v. Illinois, the Attorney General of California and fifty-five district attorneys filed an
amici curiae brief asking for a strict interpretation of Escobedo because, they argued,
a liberal reading of Escobedo would make law enforcement impossible in many instances. Comment, 5 Santa Clara Law. 75 (1964) ; People v. Dorado, 398 P.2d 361, 42
Cal. Rptr. 169, cert. denied, 381 U.S. 987 (1965).
6. Pece v. Cox, 74 N.M. 591, 396 P.2d 422 (1964) ; Otney v. United States, 340 F.2d
696 (10th Cir. 1965) ; Payne v. United States, 340 F.2d 748 (9th Cir. 1965) ; United
States v. Gilmore, 334 F.2d 837 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 379 U.S. 984 (1964) ; Queen v.
United States, 335 F.2d 297 (D.C. Cir. 1964) ; Carson v. Commonwealth, 382 S.W.2d
85, 95 (Ky. 1964) ; Sturgis v. State, 235 Md. 343, 201 A.2d 681 (1964) ; Parker v.
Warden, 236 Md. 236, 203 A.2d 418 (1964) ; Green v. State, 236 Md. 324, 203 A.2d
870, 873-74 (1964) ; Morford v. State, 395 P.2d 861, 864 (Nev. 1964) ; State v. Virgiano,
43 N.J. 44, 202 A.2d 657 (1964) ; Browne v. State, 24 Wis. 2d 491, 131 N.W.2d 169, 171
(1964). See Defender Newsletter, March 1, 1965, for a recent summary of state interpretations of Escobedo and Massiah v. United States.
7. 74 N.M. 591, 396 P.2d 422 (1964).
8. Ibid.
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few weeks after his arrest on a charge of rape,' the petitioner and
two co-defendants agreed to accompany officers on a one day trip
from Roswell, New Mexico, to Lubbock, Texas, for purposes of
taking a lie detector test.' While there, all three signed confessions.
The circumstances surrounding these confessions were as follows:
The polygraph operator, after asking questions in connection with
the test, told the petitioner that on the basis of the test, he would
advise him to make a statement." At that point, the operator left
the room and the New Mexico law officers entered and informed2
the petitioner that his two co-defendants had made confessions.'
The petitioner replied that he might as well make a statement. The
officers testified that the petitioner was fully advised of his right to
remain silent, and printed in bold type at the top of the confession
was the traditional warning that he did not have to make 1a statement at all and, if he did, it could be used against him at trial.
More than three weeks after the trip to Lubbock, the petitioner
was served with an information. 14 A few days later he was finally
9. Although the exact date and circumstances of the arrest are not available from
the partial record submitted as exhibits in the habeas corpus proceeding, the sentence
was set to run from that date. Record, Exhibit I, Pece v. Cox, New Mexico Supreme
Court Docket No. 85-H.C., United States District Court, Albuquerque, Docket No. 5904.
10. Record of Preliminary Hearing, Pece v. Cox, 74 N.M. 591, 396 P.2d 422 (1964).
11. This would seem to be a flagrant abuse of the administration of the polygraph
test. However, the trial judge was not concerned by the procedure used in eliciting the
confessions and ruled them to be voluntary. Record, Pece v. Cox, 74 N.M. 591, 396 P.2d
422 (1964).
12. One of the co-defendants had retained counsel who had consented to let his
client go to Lubbock for the lie detector test, with the restriction that he not be interrogated and only after telling his client not to answer any questions not a part of the
test. This provided little barrier because the lie detector operator asked all the questions that were needed (Record, Pece v. Cox, supra note 9). Massiah v. United States,
307 F.2d 62 (2d Cir. 1962), rev'd 377 U.S. 201 (1964), raised an interesting question
concerning this point. That is, whether the questioning of an accused who has retained
counsel, in the absence of that counsel, is a violation of Canon 9 of the Canons of
Professional Ethics of the American Bar Association prohibiting a lawyer from conferring with an opposing party without that party's counsel present. The Second
Circuit Court assumed that for a prosecutor or his alter ego (the police) to interview
a criminal defendant in the absence of his retained counsel would be a violation of
canon 9, the sixth amendment, and due process, and would render any statements
made inadmissible at trial. Massiah v. United States, supra. Also, the Ethics Committee has held:
Where three persons are accused of related thefts, the prosecutor may not,
in the proceedings of any one of them, interview another of them represented
by counsel, except with the latter's lawyer.
American Bar Ass'n, Canons of Professional and Judicial Ethics, Opinions of Comm.
on Professional Ethics and Grievances 640, Opinion 249. See Broeder, Wong Sun-A
Study in Faith and Hope, 42 Neb. L. Rev. 483, 599-603 (1962).
13. Record, Pece v. Cox, supra note 9.
14. Ibid.
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taken before a justice of the peace for a preliminary hearing, without counsel, but he made no plea. 15 Counsel was appointed for him
The petitioner
on August 14, 1961 (forty-six days after arrest)."
17
arraignment.
his
at
guilty
not
of
plea
a
entered
At trial, the petitioner's counsel objected to admission of the
confessions that had been given in Lubbock on the ground that they
were involuntary.' A voir dire examination by the trial judge was
held, and the petitioner admitted that he read and understood the
written advice as to his right to remain silent. The trial judge held
the confessions to be admissible with the condition that the issue of
voluntariness also be ruled on by the jury.'9 No mention was made
of the fact that the confessions were taken in the absence of counsel. The petitioner was found guilty by the jury with a recommendation for clemency and sentenced from one to ninety-nine years-all
suspended, except for ten years to be served concurrently with sen20
tences on other counts.
The following reasons supported the habeas corpus petition presented to the New Mexico Supreme Court in Pece: (1) the petitioner was not represented by counsel at his preliminary hearing;
(2) the petitioner was not represented by counsel at the time he
made the inculpatory statements in Lubbock, and (3) the petitioner's confession was not properly determined to be voluntary by the
15. N.M. Stat. Ann. §41-3-1 (Repl. 1964) provides:
When the defendant is brought before the magistrate upon an arrest ...
the magistrate must immediately inform him of the charge against him, and of
his right to the aid of counsel in every stage of the proceedings, and also his
right to waive an examination [preliminary hearing] before any further proceedings are had.
The magistrate has no authority to appoint counsel for indigents. But see N.M. R. Civ.
P. 92. See Comment, 4 Natural Resources J. 616, 617 nn.10, 11, 13 ; 624 n.54 (1965).
16. Record, Pece v. Cox, supra note 10.
17. Record, Pece v. Cox, supra note 9.
18. Ibid.
19. Record, Pece v. Cox, upra note 9. This is the Massachusetts procedure as opposed to the Wigmore or "orthodox" procedure of an independent determination by
the trial judge with no determination by jury. Both procedures were approved in
Jackson v. Denno, 378 U.S. 368 (1964). In Jackson, the Supreme Court held that a
determination of voluntariness by jury alone was unconstitutional. The New Mexico or
Massachusetts procedure has many of the same problems as the procedure condemned
in Jackson. It is very difficult to determine whether the judge in New Mexico is using
a weaker standard because he knows there will be a second determination by jury or
whether he actually makes an independent determination as constitutionally required by
Jackson. See Jackson v. Denno, id. at 436 (dissenting opinion, Harlan, J.).
20. Record, Pece v. Cox, sutra note 9.
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trial court. 21 The
New Mexico Supreme Court by per curiam opinion
22
held, Quashed.
The New Mexico court rejected the position taken by the petitioner that the recent case of Escobedo v. Illinois23 was dispositive
of his petition. The court, instead, relied on the prejudice test of
2 4 that
Crooker v. California,
the admission of statements taken
after a denial of counsel requires a reversal only if the defendant
had been denied "fundamental fairness" and would not have been
convicted in the absence of the statements. In so holding, Pece v.
Cox is contrary to the spirit and principles set forth in Escobedo v.
Illinois. The effect of Escobedo is that when an investigation is no
longer a general inquiry into an unsolved crime but has begun to
focus on a particular suspect, the suspect has an absolute and fundamental constitutional right to be represented by counsel at any interrogation.
In Escobedo, the defendant was arrested and taken to police
headquarters for interrogation in connection with the fatal shooting
of his brother-in-law. Escobedo made repeated requests to see his
lawyer. His lawyer, though present in the building and demanding
to see his client, was denied access to him. After persistent questioning and after being told that another suspect had implicated him in
the crime, Escobedo made several inculpatory statements, 25 subsequently used at his trial. Escobedo was convicted of murder. The
Supreme Court of Illinois affirmed, 2 but the United States Supreme
Court reversed. The Supreme Court ostensibly held that
where . . . the investigation is no longer a general inquiry into an

unsolved crime but has begun to focus on a particular suspect, the
suspect has been taken into police custody, the police carry out a
21. Pece v. Cox, 74 N.M. 591, 396 P.2d 422 (1964).

22. Ibid. The court disposed of the issue of lack of counsel at the preliminary hearing by reference to Sanders v. Cox, 74 N.M. 525, 395 P.2d 353, cert. denied, 379 U.S.
978 (1964), 4 Natural Resources J. 616.
23. 378 U.S. 478 (1964).
24. 357 U.S. 433 (1958).

25. The statements consisted of an admission of complicity in the murder plot. Mr.
Justice Goldberg noted that the defendant's ignorance of Illinois law and the effect of
an admission of "mere" complicity was legally as damaging as admission of firing the
shots. "The 'guiding hand of counsel' was essential to advise petitioner of his rights in
this delicate situation." Escobedo v. Illinois, 378 U.S. 478, 486 (1964).
26. Illinois v. Escobedo, 28 11. 2d 41, 190 N.E.2d 825 (19*63). It is interesting to note
that the Illinois court in its original opinion of February 1, 1963, held the statement to
be inadmissible and reversed the conviction on the basis that the statement was not

voluntary.
27. Escobedo v. Illinois, 378 U.S. 478 (1964).
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process of interrogations that lends itself to eliciting incriminating
statements, the suspect has requested and been denied an opportunity
to consult with his lawyer, and the police have not effectively warned
him of his absolute constitutional right to remain silent, the accused
has been denied 'the Assistance of Counsel' in violation of the Sixth
Amendment to the Constitution as 'made obligatory upon the States
by the Fourteenth Amendment,' . . . and that no statement elicited

by the police during the interrogation may be used against him at a
criminal trial.28 [Citation omitted.]

The New Mexico Supreme Court's interpretation of Escobedo,
as set forth in Pece v. Cox, allows the court to "indulge in nice calculations as to the amount of prejudice arising" from a denial of
counsel, 29 and to limit Escobedo strictly to its facts. Mr. Justice
Goldberg, who wrote the majority opinion in Escobedo, does purport to limit his decision to the particular facts surrounding Escobedo's confession. However, a careful reading of Escobedo in light
of other recent Supreme Court opinions80 brings one to the conclusion that Escobedo goes far beyond what the New Mexico court
held in Pece v. Cox.
Even the New Mexico court would not hold that the right to
counsel would depend upon whether a lawyer was outside the interrogation room demanding access to his client. Nor would it be a
rational limitation to predicate this right upon the fortuitous event
that a defendant had anticipated arrest and retained counsel, or that
a relative had retained counsel for him upon hearing of his arrest.
Another limitation present in the "limiting" facts of Escobedo is
a request by the defendant to have counsel. It is hard to see how a
constituitonal right can be dependent on a request. In Escobedo the
Court said:
We have also learned the companion lesson of history that no system of criminal justice can, or should, survive if it comes to depend
for its continued effectiveness on the citizens'
abdication through un3
awareness of their constitutional rights. '
28. Id. at 490-91.

29. Pece v. Cox, 74 N.M. 591, 396 P.2d 422 (1964). The New Mexico court gave no
basis for distinguishing Escobedo, except that they felt that Crooker v. California, 357
U.S. 433 (1958), was controlling. Because the defendant had been warned of his
right to remain silent, and because the confession was voluntary, the New Mexico court
probably felt these were the distinguishing factors. However, in Escobedo, it is conceded
that the confession was voluntary, and there is strong evidence that the defendant
Escobedo knew of his right to be silent. See text at note 38 infra.
30. See note 35 infra.
31. Escobedo v. Illinois, 378 U.S. 478, 490 (1964).
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Such a limitation would deny the right expressed by Escobedo to
the unwary, the vagrant, the slum dweller, and to the poverty-ridden Negroes, Mexicans, and other minority groups who need most
the "guiding hand of counsel.' 32 The hardened professional criminal
33
would undoubtedly be aware of a technical necessity of request.
Equally nebulous is the condition that police did not effectively
warn the accused of his right to remain silent. Escobedo would be
meaningless if, as one recent commentator has said, it requires the
alternative of either ( 1 ) allowing the accused to see counsel, or (2)
advising him of his right to remain silent.3 4 The requirement to preface an interrogation with a warning of one's fifth amendment right
to remain silent is basic and goes to the heart of a determination of
voluntariness.3 5 One of the major problems with the-warning of the
right to be silent, in lieu of the right to have counsel, is the insuperable burden of proof that the defendant would have in showing a
warning was not made. The typical situation would have the defendant denying that he had been warned and the policeman testifying
that the warning was given. A judicial determination, at best, would
be a guess with the odds weighed against the defendant.
Construing Escobedo to hold that an effective warning to be
silent is a substitute for the sixth amendment right to counsel is to
say that the only function of counsel is to give the warning. The
32. Mr. Justice Traynor, concurring in People v. Garner, 57 Cal. 2d 135, 165, 367
P.2d 680, 698 (1961), also recognized the disadvantage inflicted upon an accused who
is ignorant of legal process: "Giving an accused who has the means and foresight to
retain an attorney (frequently the 'professional criminal') a right to counsel's presence
during interrogation, would widen the gulf between the rights of a person with and
one without counsel." Cited in People v. Dorado, 398 P.2d 361, 42 Cal. Rptr. 169, n.6
(1965). Kamisar, The Right to Counsel and the Fourteenth Amendment: A Dialogue
on "The Most Pervasive Right" of an Accused, 30 U. Chi. L. Rev. 1, 23 (1962).
33. The United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit has ruled that the
right to counsel is not dependent upon a request by the person interrogated. United
States ex rel. Russo v. New Jersey, May 20, 1965. See also People v. Dorado, 398 P.2d
361, 42 Cal. Rptr. 169 (1965) ; State v. Neeley, 398 P.2d 482 (Ore. 1965) ; State v. Dufour, 206 A.2d 82 (R.I. 1965).
34. 5 Santa Clara Law. 75, 77 (1964).
35. In Haynes v. Washington, 373 U.S. 503, 511 (1963), the Court referred to the
"right to remain silent." See also Culombe v. Connecticut, 367 U.S. 568, 631 (1961);
Crooker v. California, 357 U.S. 433 (1958). In State v. Dufour, 206 A.2d 82, 85 (R.I.
1965), the Supreme Court of Rhode Island cited and followed People v. Dorado, 394
P.2d 952 (Cal. 1964) [opinion vacated and new opinion filed, 398 P.2d 361, 42 Cal.
Rptr. 169 (1965)], holding that when a defendant has not requested counsel prior to
making a confession, he "must not only have been advised of his right to assistance of
counsel when requested but he must also have been warned of his right to remain
silent." See also People v. Dorado, supra; People v. Neely, 398 P.2d 482 (Ore. 1965).
But see cases cited note 6 supra.
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right to counsel has far more value to an accused than to warn him
of his rights. The presence of counsel provides a defendant with
moral support, if nothing else, needed to withstand the pressures of
confinement.8 6 Counsel is needed for investigative purposes. Under
existing state procedure, evidence is often destroyed or witnesses
have disappeared before a lawyer has the opportunity to make an
investigation. The lawyer can contact friends, arrange bail, and proservices important to the protection of the defendant's
vide other
8 7
rights.
Furthermore, the facts of Escobedo strongly indicate that Escobedo knew-from gestures made to him by his lawyer while the
door to the interrogation room was open-that he should not say
anything. 8 This was not much of a warning, but it was as effective
as a printed statement on a confession form or half-hearted advice
by a policeman, either of which are often held to be sufficient. Therefore, one must conclude that Escobedo's confession was held inadmissible because it was taken following an interrogation in the
absence of counsel, not because it was involuntary.
Other elements of the Escobedo opinion support the conclusion,
not reached by the New Mexico court in Pece v. Cox, that an accused
has the absolute right to counsel at interrogation. Examination of
the footnote citations in Escobedo gives one an insight into the
philosophy behind the principle stated in that case. The citation of
the New Judges' Rules in England provides a clear indication that
the court intended to abolish any distinction between post-indictment interrogation and pre-indictment interrogation. 9 The New
36. On the effect of the superego and the masochistic need for punishment compelling one to confess after a period of detention, see People v. Garner, 57 Cal. 2d 135,
164, 367 P.2d 680, 697 n.3 (1961). It is also evident that the people of the intelligence
level that are likely to be abused are sometimes quite susceptible to suggestion. A lawyer
is needed to protect them from themselves. See Koestler, Darkness at Noon (1948).
37. The value of counsel is limited only by counsel and what he would do in behalf
of his client. It is not clear how much the lawyer would be required to do in behalf of
his client. Seemingly, as a bare minimum, he is required to go to the police station when
called and talk to his client. Additionally, he would probably be required to do anything that requires immediate action for the welfare of his client, such as arranging
bail if the client can afford it.
The attorney can, of course, ethically refuse to accept employment unless appointed
by the court. However, as the right to counsel shifts to the pre-indictment stage, some
procedure for prompt appointment of counsel must be made. See note 15 supra.
38. Escobedo v. Illinois, 378 U.S. 478, 480 n.1 (1964).
39. Id. at 487 n.6:
The English Judges' Rules also recognize that a functional rather than a
formal test must be applied and that, under circumstances as those here, no special significance should be attached to formal indictment. The applicable Rule

OCTOBER, 1965]

COMMENT

Judges' Rules abolished the distinction between the time when a
policeman in England has "reasonable grounds for suspecting" and
the time when the policeman "makes up his mind to charge" the
suspect, for purposes of the policeman's duty to caution the defendant of his rights.40
The reference in Escobedo to the American Bar Association's
Canon 9 is another illustration of the general attitude of the Court
in this area. 41 It would seem to follow that if it is unethical and possibly illegal for a prosecuting attorney to talk to a defendant without his counsel present, then surely the prosecuting attorney could
not avoid the command of this canon by condoning police interrogation in absence of counsel.4 2 This, taken with the fact that police advice by definition is poor advice, should lend considerable weight to
the importance the Court has placed on the sixth amendment right
to counsel.
The Court in Escobedo seems to be analogizing our present system to that of the Soviet Union by its reference to the Soviet system.4 3 Both systems have been referred to as an "appeal from pretrial investigation." Prior to Escobedo and Massiah, the American
system did not require a lawyer to be present at the pretrial interrogation.
Other footnotes to the Escobedo opinion indicate concern by the
does not permit the police to question an accused, except in certain extremely
limited situations not relevant here, at any time after the defendant 'has been
charged or informed that he may be prosecuted.' Crim. L. Rev. 166-70 (1964).
[Emphasis by the Court.]
40. 11 Crim. L. Rev. 166, 167 (1964): "It should be noted that the requirement of
cautioning the defendant of his rights where there is reasonable grounds for suspecting
in no way affects the persons right to consult privately with a solicitor."
41. Escobedo v. Illinois, 378 U.S. 478, 487, n.7 (1964), quoting from American Bar
Association's Canons of Professional Ethics:
'A lawyer should not in any way communicate upon the subject of controversy with a party represented by counsel; much less should he undertake
to negotiate or compromise the matter with him, but should deal only with his
counsel. It is incumbent upon the lawyer most particularly to avoid everything
that may tend to mislead a party not represented by counsel, and he should not
undertake to advise him as to the law.'
See Broeder, supra note 12, at 599-604, and note 12 supra generally.
42. See note 12 supra. The assumption that the canon 9 violation would also be a
denial of due process is saying a great deal. This first thought on the subject might
well serve as a warning to zealous prosecutors who may condone police advising the
criminal accused of his legal alternatives.
43. Escobedo v. Illinois, 378 U.S. 478, 488 n.9 (1964):
The Soviet Criminal Code does not permit a lawyer to be present during
the investigation. The Soviet trial has thus been aptly described as 'an appeal
from the pretrial investigation.' Feifer, Justice in Moscow 86 (1964).
Supporting the American view is In re Groban, 352 U.S. 330, 344 (1957).
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Escobedo Court about the possibility of coerced confessions.4 4 A
major cause for concern about the i'ight of counsel at this early stage
relates to the fifth amendment privilege against self-incrimination.
If Escobedo is limited by a restrictive standard of the voluntarinessinvoluntariness test, as suggested by the New Mexico court, little
would be added to existing safeguards of fifth amendment privileges.
At first impression, this may seem an unwarranted emphasis on
footnote references. However, footnotes help illuminate what the
Court is saying. A reading of the materials cited in Escobedo makes
clear the Court's conclusion on the issue of the absolute right to
counsel at interrogation. The fact that the Supreme Court has relied
on commentaries of this nature has independent value in the interpretation of Escobedo; commentators with a more moderate view
would have been cited if theirs had been the position the Court was
taking. There can be little doubt that members of the majority in
Escobedo knew the views advanced in the materials they relied
upon; though not a formal part of the opinion, these citations give
45
a good idea of the philosophy of the Court in this area.
The dissent in Escobedo by Mr. Justice White suggests a possible
intermediate position to the one taken here:
At the very least the Court holds that once the accused becomes a
suspect and, presumably, is arrested, any admission made to the
police thereafter is inadmissible in evidence unless the accused has
46
waived his right to counsel.

This is a reasonable interpretation of the majority opinion. However, to hold that a defendant could waive his right to counsel at a
time prior to arraignment considerably weakens the sixth amendment right to counsel. If the majority opinion is grounded in a
concern about "third degree" practices used by police in obtaining
confessions, then to place the iudicial function of determining the
existence of an "intelligent waiver" with the police defeats the end
44. Escobedo v. Illinois, 378 U.S. 478, nn.lC-13 (1964).
45. The materials cited by the majority in Escobedo are uniformly of the view that
the criminal defendant should be provided with counsel at the critical stage of his
prosecution. These authorities feel, and a majority of the United States Supreme Court
have now held, that the "critical stage" is reached when the police focus their attention
on one suspect.
46. Escobedo v. Illinois, 378 U.S. 478, 495 (1964).
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sought by requiring the presence of counsel at interrogation.4 7
Stated bluntly, if a policeman would lie about the "flattery of hope"
or the "impression of fear,"' 48 he would lie about a defendant waiving his right to counsel. Exactly what an "intelligent waiver" means
is not clear. It does seem that the standards for determining whether
a defendant waived his right to counsel should be at least as strict
as the waiver of any other fundamental constitutional right. Specifically, the waiver should only be allowed to be effective if made in
the presence of a judicial officer, such as a magistrate. 4 The magistrate would have a very important responsibility to see that any
waiver is made with full knowledge by the defendant of what his
rights are. This might entail further questioning by the magistrate
if it is not absolutely clear that the defendant fullyunderstands his
right and still does not want counsel.50 It is quite clear in Escobedo
that if the officers question a person before he has waived his right
to counsel, or question him in the absence of counsel when he has
not waived counsel, the results of the questioning should be inadmissible at trial. 51
47. For a discussion of waiver of the right to have counsel, see Comment, 4 Natural
Resources J. 616 (1965).
48. Brain v. United States, 168 U.S. 532, 547 (1897).
49. If the Court in Jackson v. Denno, 378 U.S. 368 (1964), was concerned about
permitting a jury to determine the voluntariness of a confession, it would seem incongruous to place protection of an equally important constitutional safeguard-the
right to counsel-in police officers. Other cases provide that a strong presumption arises
against a waiver of a "fundamental right" and such determination should be by a
judge. Fahy v. Connecticut, 375 U.S. 85 (1963) ; Carnley v. Cochran, 369 U.S. 506
(1962) ;Glasser v. United States, 315 U.S. 60 (1942) ; Aetna Ins. Co. v. Kennedy, 301
U.S. 389 (1937).
50. Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458 (1938).
51. It has been suggested that appointment of counsel at, or immediately before, the
preliminary hearing is the earliest practicable time that it can be insisted upon under
existing conditions. See Beaney, The Right to Counsel: Past, Present, and Future, 49
Va. L. Rev. 1150, 1158 (1963). Several years ago it was suggested that perhaps the
Court would see the link between the right to prompt arraignment and the right to
counsel as requirements under the fourteenth amendment. Yet another solution would
overrule Crooker and require counsel during interrogation. Note, Right to Counsel
During Police Interrogation, 16 Rutgers L. Rev. 573 (1962).
It is now submitted that a requirement of right to counsel during interrogation
necessarily carries with it the incorporation of Rule 5, Federal Rules of Criminal
Procedure, which says that "an officer .. .shall take the arrested person without unnecessary delay before the nearest available commissioner." See Broeder, supra note
12, at 564-94. A few constitutional problems arising from a failure to arraign promptly,
as pointed out by Professor Broeder, include: (1) a deprivation of the right to bail as
guaranteed by the eighth amendment and due process of law; (2) cruel and unusual
punishment proscribed by the eighth amendment and due process of law; (3) violation
of article I, §§ 9 and 10, prohibiting bills of attainder; (4) unconstitutional suspension
of the writ of habeas corpus in violation of article I, § 9, and (5) failure to promptly
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In rejecting the petitioner's argument under Escobedo, the New
Mexico Supreme Court held that Crooker v. California12 was controlling, and based its decision on the ground that Pece was not prejudiced. In Crooker, the defendant was a thirty-one year old college
graduate who had attended one year of law school. After several
hours of questioning, he confessed to killing his paramour. Crooker
had not been advised of his right to remain silent, but he had requested counsel; this request was denied. The Supreme Court of the
United States held that in the absence of a showing that the defendant's trial was lacking in basic fairness, a denial of counsel did
not violate due process.
Crooker v. California is not controlling under the facts of Pece
v. Cox for several reasons. First, the facts are different, and second,
Crooker is not good law, in light of Gideon, Escobedo, and other
recent decisions. Compared to Crooker's one year of law school,
Pece had a third grade education. Crooker had an awareness of
his right to counsel. Pece never indicated that he thought he had
the right to appointed counsel if he desired it. Equally disturbing is
the fact that it was impossible under procedure existing in New
Mexico for the authorities to have fully advised Pece of his right to
counsel. Gideon v. Wainwright was not then decided; and, unless
the New Mexico police were far more sophisticated than most, they
would not have known that the right to appointed counsel follows
the sixth amendment guarantee of counsel whenever circumstances
require it.
The other problem raised by reliance on Crooker is that the prejudice test is, and should be, ignored when a confession is involved.
This "basic fairness," or prejudice, test relating to a denial of counsel was a product of the Supreme Court decision in Betts v. Brady. 5
The Betts case, of course, has now been overruled by Gideon v.
Wainwright. 4 The Gideon decision made the sixth amendment
arraign violators and arrested persons violates their due process right to prepare an
adequate defense. Professor Broeder, id. at 570, also set forth an argument under
;Von# Sun that the right to prompt arraignment has been placed on a fourth amendment ground and is applicable to the states.
52. 357 U.S. 433 (1958).
53. 316 U.S. 455 (1942). Belts held that
the asserted denial of due process is to be tested by an appraisal of the totality
of facts in a given case. That which may, in one setting, constitute a denial of
fundamental fairness, shocking to the universal sense of justice, may, in other
circumstances, and in light of other considerations, fall short of such denial.
316 U.S. at 462.
54. 372 U.S. 335, 339 (1962).
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guarantee of counsel obligatory on the states through the fourteenth
amendment. In doing so, it abolished the test of "fundamental fairness" in considering the effect of a denial of counsel.
In light of the Gideon decision, the effect of Escobedo is to move
the time that the right to counsel accrues back to the point of any
interrogation of the accused."
57
56
The decisions in Hamilton v. 4labama, White v. Maryland,
and Massiah v. United States,5" had already weakened the authority of Crooker v. California." Hamilton held that when a defendant
does not have counsel present at a preliminary hearing when that
stage is critical in his criminal proceeding, the absence of counsel
then constitutes a violation of his rights under the due process clause
of the fourteenth amendment. The Supreme Court in Hamilton
said:
When one pleads to a capital charge without benefit of counsel,
we do not stop to determine whether prejudice resulted. . . . In
this case . . . the degree of prejudice can never be known. Only the
presence of counsel could have enabled this accused to know all the
defenses available to him and to plead intelligently. 0 [Citations
omitted.]
White v. Maryland reiterates the holding in Hamilton v. Alabama.
Chief Justice Kenison said in his dissent to the New Hampshire
court's reliance on the test of prejudice:
It is difficult to see how the secret detention and denial of counsel during lengthy interrogation can be approved if the right to counsel demanded by Gideon v. Wainwright and White v. Maryland is
to be meaningful and effective ....
61 [Citations omitted.]
55. While it may not be clear regarding the absolute right to counsel, it is clear
that an interrogation cannot be undertaken in the absence of counsel if counsel has
been retained.

56. 368 U.S. 52 (1961).
57.
58.
59.
60.
61.

373 U.S. 59 (1963).
377 U.S. 201 (1964).
357 U.S. 433 (1958).
Hamilton v. Alabama, 368 U.S. 52, 55 (1962).
State v. Nelson, 105 N.H. 184, 196 A.2d 52, 60 (1963). The court in Nelson,
supra, noted that Professor Sutherland, a perceptive commentator on constitutional
law, had described the inconsistency between the Crooker-Cicenia prejudice doctrine
and the rationale of White v'. Maryland: "Time seems to be running against Crooker
and Cicenia." Sutherland, Detention, Interrogation, and the Right to Counsel, Address
Delivered to the Conference of Chief Justices, Aug. 15, 1963.
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The dissent in Massiah likewise conceded the weakening effect of
that decision on Crooker: "[U]ntil now, the Court has expressly
rejected the argument that admissions are to be deemed voluntary
if made outside the presence of council." 2
Finally, the Escobedo opinion itself in no way limits the exclusion
of the defendant's statements by the amount of prejudice he suffered. The Court in Escobedo was commanding in its holding, "that
no statement elicited by the police during the interrogation may be
63
used against him at a criminal trial."
The Supreme Court has not hesitated to use the exclusionary
rule and doctrine of automatic reversal in other areas. It is difficult
to see why state courts have problems with the rule concerning
right to counsel at interrogation. Mapp v. Ohio called for the exclusion of evidence obtained in an illegal search."' Coerced confessions have long been held to result in automatic reversal.6" Likewise,
the knowing use of perjured evidence has resulted in automatic reversals for many years. 66

The Second Circuit Court of Appeals has correctly interpreted
the impact of the Gideon decision on the Crooker test of prejudice:
Before Gideon, it may have been possible to argue that the more
egregious cases or prejudice could be rectified if pleas of guilty were
reviewed for 'fundamental fairness.' But it is precisely this sort of
elusive and unsatisfactory inquiry into the possibility of prejudice
which Gideon sought to inter once and for all. Indeed, the overruling
of Betts by Gideon seems grounded on two fundamental assumptions:
that a criminal defendant compelled to act without the advice of
counsel will always be disadvantaged thereby, and that the precise
62. Massiah v. United States, 377 U.S. 201, 210 (1964). (Emphasis added.)
63. Escobedo v. Illinois, 378 U.S. 478, 491 (1964).
64. Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961).
65. Lynumn v. Illinois, 372 U.S. 528 (1963); Blackburn v. Alabama, 361 U.S. 199
(1960) ; Spano v. New York, 360 U.S. 315 (1959).
66. Mesarosh v. United States, 352 U.S. 1 (1956) ; Coggins v. O'Briedi, 188 F.2d 130
(1st Cir. 1951).
Chief Justice Magruder of the First Circuit Court of Appeals, in Coggins, supra,
made an eloquent statement concerning the use of tainted evidence:
I take it that such constitutional claim is not to be defeated merely because
there may have been other evidence, untainted, sufficient to warrant a conviction; that the burden is not on the petitioner to show a probability that in the
jury's deliberations the perjured evidence tipped the scales in favor of conviction. If the prosecutor is not content to rely on the untainted evidence and
chooses to 'button up' the case by the known use of perjured testimony, an ensuing conviction cannot stand, and there is no occasion to speculate upon what the
jury would have done without the perjured testimony before it.
188 F.2d at 139.

OCTOBER, 19651

COMMENT

degree of that disadvantage can never be satisfactorily measured by
an after-the-fact search for prejudice. . . [T]here would seem no
warrant for resurrecting a rule of law which has been so thoroughly
discredited. 6 7

Over twenty years ago the Supreme Court said: "The right to have
counsel is too fundamental and absolute to allow courts to indulge
in nice calculations as to the amount of prejudice arising from its
denial ...."6' How, then, could it be said, as it was in Pece v. Cox,
that a denial of counsel at interrogation is not reversible error if not
prejudicial?
The state courts, including New Mexico in Pece v. Cox, seem to
base their refusal to adhere strictly to the requirements of Escobedo
because of its supposedly adverse effect on law enforcement. There
are several answers to this concern. Mr. Justice Goldberg provided
the alternative in his opinion in Escobedo:
No system worth preserving should have to fear that if an accused

is permitted to consult with a lawyer, he will become aware of, and
exercise, these rights. If the exercise of constitutional rights will
thwart the effectiveness of a system of law enforcement, then there is
something very wrong with that system. 9
If the state courts do not agree with the United States Supreme
Court, they should not attack its decisions by watering down their
effectiveness; they should work for a new system. However, our
system is not so bad. Mr. Justice Douglas has said that our system
"by respecting the dignity of the least worthy citizen, raises the
stature of all of us and builds an atmosphere of trust and confidence
in government." 70
Neither New Mexico nor any other state lacks the resources to
create an effective system of criminal justice for all. Professor
Beaney has made the intelligent suggestion that perhaps the most
effective way to prevent judicial intervention in the future is to establish as soon as feasible criminal justice procedures that more than
meet the minimum standards now imposed by the United States

Supreme Court."
67. United States ex rel. Durocher v. LaVallee, 330 F.2d 303, 308-09 (2d Cir.),
cert. denied, 377 U.S. 998 (1964), cited in Comment, 4 Natu'ral Resources J. 616, 622 n.45

(1965).
68.
69.
70.
71.

Glasser v. United States, 315 U.S. 60, 70 (1942).
Escobedo v. Illinois, 378 U.S. 478, 490 (1964).
Stein v. New York, 346 U.S. 156 (1953) (Douglas, J., dissenting).
Beaney, supra note 51, at 1158.
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As a final note on Escobedo, Professor Kamisar has said that the
law will cease to grow when it fails to absorb new principles and
slough off old ones; and further:
'If it is true as I think it is, that since changing the law is like making a change in the intricate part of an organized drama, you cannot
change one part without other parts being affected in unexpected
ways.' [Quoting Cohen, Reason and Nature 421 (2d ed. 1953).]
A moment's reflection brings one to the fore of another truth:
neither can you leave one part, at least a major part, unaltered
without it affecting the other changing parts in unexpected ways ...
Because this is so, the failure to advance on the right to counsel 72
front
seriously undermines the advances we have made in other sectors.
Perhaps one could justify the New Mexico court's action concerning Escobedo in the sense that it prevents the severe handicap
on law enforcement which would result in a liberal reading of that
opinion. The answer is that a too restricted and limited reading of
the decisions of the United States Supreme Court will harm, not
help, law enforcement officers. 73 For a state supreme court to advise
law enforcement officers that Escobedo has no great effect on existing procedure is not a help but a hindrance. Police relying on the
typical state court interpretation of Escobedo will find that convictions based on confessions taken without counsel, or without an intelligent waiver of counsel, will fail upon examination by the United
States Supreme Court. As a result, police work in that situation
would come to naught. 74 The public would be better protected by
avoiding unnecessary reversals, not promoting them.
WILLIAM H. CARPENTER

72. Kamisar, The Right to Counsel and the Fourteenth Amendment: A Dialogue
on "The Most Pervasive Right" of the Accused, 30 U. Chi. L. Rev. 1, 21 (1962).
73. People v. Dorado, 398 P.2d 361, 42 Cal. Rptr. 169, cert. denied, 381 U.S. 987
(1965).
74. Ibid.

